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THE EFFECT OF THE RODDA ACT ON PUBLIC
SCHOOL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
I. INTRODUCTION
Employer-employee relations in public elementary and secondary
schools and community colleges in California have been governed since
July 1, 1976 by the Rodda Act (the Act).' This law, repealing and
superseding the Winton Act,2 establishes a procedure similar to that
used in the private sector under the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA).3 While the Rodda Act contains a number of interesting fea-
tures,4 the provisions likely to generate the greatest amount of litigation
are those prohibiting engaging in unfair employment practices.5
This comment will analyze the extent to which the public school em-
ployer unfair employment practices set out by the Rodda Act 6 affect
the rights and obligations of the concerned parties with respect to
several important issues. Since much of the language and many of the
concepts of the Rodda Act were drawn directly from the NLRA, 7 ju-
dicial interpretations of analogous provisions in the federal law will be
relied upon to predict how the California law will be construed in this
area.8  At the same time, an effort will be made to identify, and to
1. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3540-3549 (West Supp. 1977).
2. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 13080-13089 (West 1975) (repealed 1976).
3. 29 U.S.C. § 151-168 (1970 &Supp. 1977).
4. The Rodda Act includes a grant of "rights" not only to employees, but also to
employee organizations, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3543-3543.1 (West Supp. 1977); the
establishment of a procedure for school employees to "meet and negotiate" with their
employer through an "exclusive representative," id. §§ 3543.3, 3544-3544.9; a require-
ment that public school employers and exclusive representatives submit their initial
negotiation proposals to public review, id. § 3547; the creation of an Education Employ-
ment Relations Board, id. H9 3541, 3541.3; and the institution of an impasse resolution
process utilizing mediators, fact-finders, and binding arbitration, id. § 3548-3548.8.
For a more thorough discussion of the important features of the Rodda Act, see Review
of Selected 1975 California Legislation, 7 PAc. L.J. 451 (1975).
5. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3543.5-.6 (West Supp. 1977).
6. Id. § 3543.5.
7. Compare, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3543.5 (West Supp. 1977) with 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a) (1970).
8. The California Supreme Court has held that such an approach is proper:
[B]ecause the federal decisions effectively reflect the same interests as those that
prompted the inclusion of the . . . bargaining limitation in the charter provision
and state act, the federal precedents provide reliable if analogous authority on the
issue.
. . . We therefore conclude that the bargaining requirements of the National
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forecast the effect of, substantive differences between the two statutes
and between the employment environments they regulate.
The scope of this comment will not include all the unfair employ-
ment practice provisions of the Rodda Act.' It will be limited to those
issues which are certain to arise under the statute and with which there
has been relevant experience in the private sector. The problems to
be considered include: the right of a public school employer to prohibit
employees and non-employee union organizers from engaging in or-
ganizational solicitation on school property; the ability of a public school
employer to express its views on unionization freely; the vulnerability
of public school employees to interrogation as to union affiliation; the
right of public school management to involve itself with, or give support
to, employee organizations; and the legitimacy of discrimination against
employees.
I. ORGANIZATIONAL SOLICITATION
An issue of great importance to a union attempting to organize a
group of employees is whether the employer may impede the union's
Labor Relations Act and cases interpreting them may properly be referred to for
such enlightenment as they may render ....
Fire Fighters Union, Local 1186 v. City of Vallejo, 12 Cal. 3d 608, 617, 526 P.2d
971, 977, 116 Cal. Rptr. 507, 513 (1974). See also Social Workers' Local 535 v.
Alameda County Welfare Dep't, 11 Cal. 3d 572, 504 P.2d 453, 113 Cal. Rptr. 461
(1974); Englund v. Chavez, 8 Cal. 3d 572, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1972);
Petri Cleaners, Inc. v. Automotive Employees Local 88, 53 Cal. 2d 455, 349 P.2d
76, 2 Cal. Rptr. 470 (1960); Placentia Fire Fighters Local 2147 v. City of Placentia,
57 Cal. App. 3d 9, 129 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1976); International Ass'n of Fire Fighters
Local 1974 v. City of Pleasanton, 56 Cal. App. 3d 959, 129 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1976);
Lipow v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 54 Cal. App. 3d 215, 126 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1975);
Dublin Professional Fire Fighters Local 1885 v. Valley Community Servs. Dist., 45
Cal. App. 3d 116, 119 Cal. Rptr. 182 (1975); San Joaquin County Employees' Ass'n
v. County of San Joaquin, 39 Cal. App. 3d 83, 113 Cal. Rptr. 912 (1974); Service
Employees' Int'l Local 22 v. Roseville Community Hosp., 24 Cal. App. 3d 400, 101
Cal. Rptr. 69 (1972); International Ass'n of Fire Fighters Local 1396 v. County of
Merced, 204 Cal. App. 2d 387, 22 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1962).
9. The Rodda Act mentions a number of public school employer unfair employment
practices which have no parallel in the NLRA. These include: refusing to participate
in good faith in the impasse resolution procedure set out by the Act, CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 3543.5(e) (West Supp. 1977); denying an employee organization's right to
represent its members, id. § 3543.1(a)-.5(b); denying of an employee organization's
right of access to, and use of, school facilities, id. §§ 3543.1(b)-.5(b); denying an
employee organization's right to have a reasonable number of its representatives excused
from work responsibilities during negotiation and grievance proceedings, id. §§ 3543.1
(c)-.5(b); and denying an employee organization's right to have membership dues de-
ducted from paychecks, id. §§ 3543.1 (d)-.5(b).
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efforts by enforcing a rule against solicitation on the employment prem-
ises. In most of the private sector this issue is governed by sections
7 and 8(a)(1) of the NLRA. 10 Section 7 grants employees several
"organizational rights" including the right to self-organize, to form, join
or assist a labor organization and to bargain collectively through repre-
sentatives of their own choosing." Section 8(a)(1) protects these
rights by providing that "[ilt shall be an unfair labor practice for an
employer . . . to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section [7]."'12 In enforcing these
sections, the courts and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB
or Board) have distinguished between rules which prohibit the solicita-
tion of employees by other employees and rules which prohibit such
solicitation by non-employee union organizers.
In Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB' 3 the Supreme Court held that
an employer's enforcement of a rule prohibiting all forms of solicita-
tion 4 on his property by employees engaged in an attempt to organize
other employees during non-work periods and in non-work areas inter-
fered with their section 7 organizational rights, thus violating section
8(a)(1).'5 Enforcement of the rule during work periods and in work
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) (1970).
11. Id. § 157.
12. Id. § 158(a)(1).
13. 324 U.S. 793 (1945).
14. It should be noted that a no-solicitation rule which prohibits union solicitation
or discriminates against one union as compared with another usually violates section
8(a)(1). See NLRB v. Stowe Spinning Co., 336 U.S. 226 (1949); Time-O-Matic,
Inc. v. NLRB, 264 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1959).
15. 324 U.S. at 795-96, 805. See also NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322,
rehearing denied, 416 U.S. 952 (1974); NLRB v. Daylin, Inc., 496 F.2d 484 (6th
Cir. 1974); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1973); Na-
tional Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 415 F.2d 1231 (6th Cir. 1969); United Steelworkers of
America v. NLRB, 393 F.2d 661 (D.C. Cir. 1968). Exceptions to this rule can
be found. In Marshal Field & Co. v. NLRB, 200 F.2d 375, 381 (7th Cir. 1952),
the court held that a retail store employer's ban against solicitation in public areas
of the store even during employees' off hours was justified by the need to avoid confu-
sion for customers. In a similar case, May Dep't Stores Co., 136 N.L.R.B. 797, 49
L.R.R.M. 1862 (1962), the NLRB held that while an employer may be justified by
"special circumstances" in enforcing a no-solicitation rule against employees during
non-working time, if he does so he is obligated to provide "equal time" to any union
attempting to organize his employees. The rationale for this ruling was that the enforce-
ment of such a no-solicitation rule creates a "glaring 'imbalance in opportunities for
organizational communication."' Id. at 801, 49 L.R.R.M. at 1864. Note that this
rationale reinforces the doctrine of Republic Aviation that the employer's interest in
maintaining efficiency and discipline is to be balanced against the organizational inter-
ests of the employees. 324 U.S. at 798.
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places was held not to violate the section because of the employer's
legitimate interest in maintaining the efficiency of his operation.'0 In
so deciding, the Court balanced "the undisputed right of self-organiza-
tion assured to employees under the [NLRA with] the equally undis-
puted right of employers to maintain discipline in their establishments."'17
A different standard for determining the legality of a no-solicitation
rule enforced against non-employee union organizers on the employer's
property was utilized by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Babcock &
Wilcox Co. 8 The Court recognized two factors which required a dif-
ferent approach. The first was that any obligation of an employer to
allow non-employees to engage in organizational solicitation must be
based, not on any right of the non-employees, but rather on the need
of his employees for information in order to exercise their organiza-
-tional rights effectively. 19 The second was that to force an employer
to allow such individuals access to his property entails some sacrifice
of his property rights.20 The Court attempted to balance the conflicting
interests involved, holding that an employer need not permit non-em-
ployee distribution of union literature on his property if there are other
means of communication available and the employer does not dis-
criminate against the union by allowing other distribution. 2
Because of the similarity between the pertinent provisions of the
16. 324 U.S. at 803 n.10.
17. Id. at 797-98.
18. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
19. Id. The Court stated:
The distinction is one of substance. No restriction may be placed on the employees'
right to discuss self-organization among themselves, unless the employer can
demonstrate that a restriction is necessary to maintain production or discipline.
But no such obligation is owed nonemployee organizers. Their access to company
property is governed by a different consideration. The right of self-organization
depends in some measure on the ability of employees to learn the advantages of
self-organization from others.
Id. at 113 (citation omitted).
20. Id. at 112.
21. Id. See NLRB v. United Steelworkers of America, 357 U.S. 357 (1958) (em-
ployer may enforce non-discriminatory no-solicitation rule against non-employee union
organizers even though he has waged an anti-union propaganda campaign, so long
as alternate channels of union communication with employees are available). But cf.
NLRB v. United Aircraft Corp., 324 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
951 (1964) (employer's rule prohibiting distribution of union literature by employees
during non-working time and in non-working areas is unfair labor practice even though
alternate channels of communication may have been available). See also Hudgens
v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (balancing procedure of Babcock & Wilcox extended
to deny access to union picketers).
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Rodda Act and sections 7 and 8(a)(1) of the NLRA, 22 it is probable
that a standard similar to that implemented in Republic Aviation will
be used to evaluate any non-discriminatory no-solicitation rule invoked
against public school employees .2  To the extent that the public edu-
cation work setting is less structured than the industrial employment
environment for which that standard was fashioned, it is to be expected
that the distinction between working and non-working time and work-
ing and non-working places will receive less emphasis. But no matter
how the lines are drawn, it is to be expected that the public school em-
ployees' right of self-organization will be balanced against the public
school employer's right to maintain efficiency and discipline in the
educational process.
The validity of public school employer regulation of organizational
solicitation by non-employee union representatives on school property,
however, will be measured by criteria quite differ6nt than those
enumerated in Babcock & Wilcox. Whereas under the NLRA, the
ability of a non-employee union organizer to gain access to an em-
ployer's property is derived from the organizational rights of the em-
ployees, under the Rodda Act this ability is based directly on a right
possessed by the employee organization itself. Public school employee
organizations are, by statute, granted the right of access to employee
work areas at "reasonable times," the use of "institutional bulletin
boards, mailboxes, and other means of communication subject to rea-
sonable regulation," and the right to hold meetings in institutional facil-
ities at "reasonable times."24  As previously noted, in fashioning the
access rule in Babcock & Wilcox, the Supreme Court particularly em-
phasized the need to protect the private property interest of employers.
Because this interest is absent in the context of public education, the
22. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3543 (West Supp. 1977) grants public school employees
in California "the right to form, join and participate in the activities of employee
organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of representation on all matters
of employer-employee relations." These rights are, in turn, enforced by CAL. GOV'T
CODE § 3543.5(a) (West Supp. 1977), which makes it unlawful for a public school
to "interfere with ...employees because of their exercise of the rights guaranteed by
[the Act]."
23. It should be noted that the Republic Aviation approach has been adopted by
California courts in the interpretation of other state employment relations statutes.
See, e.g., Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 3d 392, 546
P.2d 687, 128 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1976); International Ass'n of Fire Fighters v. County
of Merced, 204 Cal. App. 2d 387, 22 Cal. Rptr. 270 (1962); see also 49 OP. CAL. ATr'Y
GEN. 1 (1967).
24. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3543.1(b) (West Supp. 1977), enforced by id. § 3543.5(b).
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California Legislature was able to grant non-employee union organizers
a great deal of freedom in obtaining entry to public school property.
As a result of the provisions included in the Rodda Act, it would
seem that a public school employer may not prohibit a non-employee
representative of an employee organization from entering school prop-
erty or using school facilities to promote unionization, irrespective of
whether alternate channels of communication with his employees are
available.
It is important to note, however, that an employee organization's
right of access to school property and use of school bulletin boards,
mailboxes, and other facilities is not absolute; it can be exercised only
at "reasonable times" or "subject to reasonable regulations."2  The
fact that the legislature chose to use such language suggests that it in-
tended the courts to utilize a type of Republic Aviation analysis in this
area as well. As such, the ability of'a public school employer to deny
an employee organization access to school property or the use of a
school facility in any given instance will depend upon the extent to
which granting the same would infringe upon the employer's interest
in maintaining efficiency and discipline in the educational process.
IH. EMPLOYER FREEDOM OF SPEECA
A significant issue to an employer in the context of an organizational
campaign is whether he may freely express his views on unionization
to his employees. In private sector employment relations this question
is governed by the interaction of the first amendment of the United
States Constitution2 6 with NLRA sections 7, 8(a) (1) and 9(c). As
noted above, section 7 grants employees certain "organizational
rights, '27 which section 8(a)(1) protects. The right to be free of co-
ercive influence when engaged in organizational activities, which these
sections grant employees, is to be weighed against the employer's first
amendment right to free speech. This latter right is reinforced by sec-
tion 9(c) which provides that the expression of any view, argument,
25. Id. § 3543.1(b).
26. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech .... " U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
27. "Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives . . . and to engage in
other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining . . . ." 29 U.s.c.
§ 157 (1970). This right is enforced through section 8(a)(1). See note 12 supra
and accompanying text.
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or opinion is not an unfair labor practice so long as "such expression
contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit. ' 2
One might assume from this that an employer is free to make any
communication to his employees regarding the exercise of their organ-
izational rights so long as he does not make overt threats or promises
of benefits. This is not, however, the interpretation adopted by the
Supreme Court in NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.2" There, the Court
held that an employer's communication to his employees of his opinion
as to the likely consequences of unionization may constitute a coercive
interference with his employees' organizational rights insofar as he is
not merely predicting future events over which he has no control.3 0
More importantly, the Court indicated that an employer must have a
"basis of objective fact" to support any prediction of consequences al-
legedly outside his control;" mere "sincerity" in making such a com-
munication is no defense to a charge of unfair labor practices.32  The
Court's rationale for adopting a rule so greatly favoring the employees'
organizational interests was that employees are economically depend-
ent on their employers and are prone "to pick up intended implications
of the latter that might be more readily dismissed by a more disinter-
ested ear.""3
The Rodda Act's approach to the issue of employer freedom of
speech is similar to that of the NLRA insofar as it grants public school
28. 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1970).
29. 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
30. Id. at 618.
31. Id. For examples of the difficulty the courts and the NLRB have had in drawing
the line between illegal threats and permissible predictions, see NLRB v. Tommy's
Spanish Foods, Inc., 463 F.2d 116 (9th Cir. 1972); Mt. Ida Footwear Co., 217 N.L.R.B.
1011, 89 L.R.R.M. 1169 (1975); Airporter Inn Hotel, 215 N.L.R.B. 824, 88 L.R.R.M.
1032 (1974); Adco Advertising, Inc., 206 N.LRB. 497, 84 L-RR.M. 1327 (1973);
Birdsall Constr. Co., 198 N.L.R.B. 163, 80 L.R.R.M 1580 (1972); Conolon Corp.,
191 N.L.R.B. 254, 77 L.R.R.M. 1395 (1971); Oxford Pickles, 190 N.L.R.B. 109, 77
L.R.R.M. 1049 (1971).
32. 395 U.S. at 618.
33. Id. at 617. An employer's freedom of speech under the NLRA is circumscribed
by the fact that in General Shoe Corp., 77 N.L.R.B. 124, 21 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1948),
the NLRB took the position that § 8(c) is irrelevant to the issue of whether a particular
election should be set aside because of an employer's communications to his employees.
The Board said that "[c]onduct that creates an atmosphere which renders improbable
a free choice will sometimes warrant invalidating an election, even though that conduct
may not constitute an unfair labor practice." Id. at 126, 21 L.R.R.M. at 1340 (empha-
sis added). When General Shoe and Gissel are considered together they imply that
the Board may be warranted in setting aside an election on the ground that an em-
ployer's communications disrupted his employees' freedom of choice, even though he
may have had objective evidence to support those communications.
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employees certain "organizational rights. '3 4  It does not follow, how-
ever, that the right of public school employers to freely express their
views on unionization is subject to as much curtailment as is the right
of their counterparts in the private sector.
The Gissel rule is vulnerable to criticism even in the industrial em-
ployment relations context in which it was fashioned. If an employer
is not free to communicate what course of conduct he intends to pursue
in the event of unionization, the organizing union's interest in recruiting
is placed above the employees' interest in knowing the risks entailed
in organizing. Also, the requirement that an employer have a "basis
of objective fact" to support his predictions imposes a far higher stan-
dard of care on the employer/speaker than is imposed in other areas
where the Supreme Court has balanced first amendment rights against
other interests.35
Reliance on the Gissel rule in the context of public education em-
ployment relations would be even less defensible. First, the under-
lying rationale for the rule that employees are easily intimidated, is
much less convincing in this employment environment. As a practical
matter, public school employers may not simply "close shop" as can em-
ployers in the private sector."' Further, classified and certified public
school employees are generally insulated from discharge by civil service
and tenure protections.3 7  They should thus be less susceptible to co-
ercion by employer communications in the exercise of their organiza-
tional rights.
Second, an application of the Gissel rule would fail to give any weight
34. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3543 (West Supp. 1977). "Public school employees shall
have the right to form, join and participate in the activities of employee organizations
of their own choosing for the purpose of representation on all matters of employer-
employee relations." Id. These rights are protected by the Act. See note 22 supra.
Significantly, the Rodda Act contains no provisions analogous to NLRA § 8(c).
35. The standard imposed by the Gissel rule appears to be higher than mere "rea-
sonability," since an employer might make a reasonable prediction as to the conse-
quences of unionization and still be guilty of an unfair labor practice for lack of
objective evidence to support it. By contrast, in defamation cases involving media
defendants, the Supreme Court has required that "public persons" plead and prove
that the defendant acted with "actual malice" (i.e., knowledge that the statements were
false or made with reckless disregard for the truth), and that "private persons" plead
and prove "fault" (i.e., at least negligence) on the part of the defendant. See Time,
Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974) (private persons); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)
(public persons).
36. See Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
37. See note 115 infra.
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to the public's right to know and speak out upon the positions taken
by its elected representatives. This interest was recognized by the Su-
preme Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan" in which the Court
said that "[t]he maintenance of the opportunity for free political discus-
sion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the
people . . . is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system."39
The interest is also recognized in the Rodda Act's requirement that
the public school employer and the exclusive representative submit their
initial negotiation proposals to public review, so that "the public [may]
be informed of the issues that are being negotiated upon and have full
opportunity to express their views on the issues to the public school em-
ployer, and to know of the positions of their elected representatives." 0
Although the conflict could be circumvented by distinguishing between
communications directed to employees and those directed to the public
at large, such a dichotomy would certainly be unrealistic, for the em-
ployees would inevitably learn of any statement made to the public.
Just how the competing interests should or will be balanced is diffi-
cult to say. One solution might be to retain that portion of the Gissel
rule holding that predictions of events within an employer's control are
illegal, while adopting a new rule that predictions of events outside his
control are unlawful only if they are made in bad faith. Whether or
not this solution is deemed desirable, an approach granting public
school employers greater latitude than that provided by the Gissel rule
seems warranted.
IV. THE INTERROGATION OF EMPLOYEES
An early issue under the NLRA was whether an employer may inter-
rogate his employees individually as to their union affiliation in order
to determine the validity of a union's claim to majority support.4' One
of the primary causes of the debate was NLRA section 9(a), which
provides that the union selected by the majority of the employees in
a bargaining unit shall be the "exclusive representative" of those em-
ployees for the purposes of collective bargaining.42 The section fails
to specify, however, how the extent of a union's support is to be deter-
mined. The NLRB's traditional approach was to rule out interrogation
38. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
39. Id. at 269 (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).
40. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3547(e) (West Supp. 1977).
41. See, e.g., Texarkana Bus Co. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 480 (8th Cir. 1941).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970).
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as a method for making such determinations by holding it to be a per
se coercive interference with the employees' "organizational rights" in
violation of section 8(a)(1).43
The traditional interpretation was overturned in Blue Flash Express,
Inc.,44 where the NLRB rejected the contention that the interrogation
of employees is such an inherently coercive and unreliable means of
verifying a union's claim to majority support that a per se rule of illegal-
ity is warranted.4" It held instead that such interrogation is unlawful
only when "under all the circumstances, . . . [it] reasonably tends to re-
strain or interfere with the employees in the exercise of rights guar-
anteed by the Act; ' 46 and whether or not a particular interrogation is
illegal is to be determined from the entire record.
47
The Blue Flash rule was substantially modified in Struksnes Con-
struction Co.,4 1 where the Board stated:
Absent unusual circumstances, the polling of employees by an em-
ployer will be violative of Section 8(a)(1) of the Act unless the fol-
lowing safeguards are observed: (1) the purpose of the poll is to
determine the truth of a union's claim of majority, (2) this purpose
is communicated to the employees, (3) assurances against reprisal are
given, (4) the employees are polled by secret ballot, and (5) the
employer has not engaged in unfair labor practices or otherwise created
a coercive atmosphere.
49
Although the Struksnes "safeguards" provide greater protection to
employee organizational rights than did the Blue Flash rule, any retreat
from the traditional approach is open to the criticism made by the dis-
43. Standard-Coosa-Thatcher Co., 85 N.L.R.B. 1358, 1359-60, 24 L.R.R.M. 1575
(1949).
44. 109 N.L.R.B. 591, 34 L.R.R.M. 1384 (1954).
45. Id. at 593, 34 LR.R.M. at 1386. The decision is particularly surprising in
light of the facts of Blue Flash. The employer had been informed by the union that
it represented a majority of his employees, that it was prepared to prove this (by
a showing of authorization cards), and that it desired to commence negotiations. The
employer thereupon interviewed each of his employees in his office for the purpose
of verifying the union's claim to majority support. Though he assured them that he
bore no animus toward the union, every employee denied having signed an authoriza-
tion card. Id. at 592, 34 LR.R.M. at 1385.
46. Id. at 593, 34 L.R.R.M. at 1386 (emphasis added).
47. Id. at 594, 34 L.R.R.M. at 1386.
48. 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 65 LR.R.M. 1385 (1967).
49. Id. at 1063, 65 L.R.R.M. at 1386. These guidelines have generally been followed
by the Board and the courts in recent years. See NLRB v. Super Toys, Inc., 458
F.2d 180, 182-83 (9th Cir. 1972); Northeastern Dye Works, Inc., 203 N.L.R.B. 1222,
83 L.R.R.M. 1225 (1973); but see General Mercantile & Hardware C. v. NLRB,
461 F.2d 952, 954 (8th Cir. 1972).
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sent in Blue Flash. When an employer is confronted with a union re-
quest for recognition under the NLRA, several courses of action are
open to him. He can ask the union to present proof of its majority
support, request that the union file a petition for a Board election, or
file a petition for an election himself. "With all these avenues open
to an employer," the dissenters argued, "plainly there is'no need for
him to utilize interrogation with its coercive effect, in order to reply
to a union's request for recognition . . . ."50 This argument is rein-
forced by the Board's holding in Linden Lumber Division, Summer &
Co.,"' that absent interference with an election, an employer may re-
fuse to grant a union recognition on any basis other than the results
of a Board election, and that the employer need not petition for the
election himself.52
It is doubtful that the Struksnes approach will be applied to public
education employment relations in California,53 however, because the
Rodda Act includes provisions which make the rule unnecessary and
undesirable. The method employed by the Act making an employer's
coercive interference with his employees' exercise of their organiza-
tional rights illegal is identical to that used by the NLRA.es But unlike
the NLRA, the Rodda Act provides public school employers with a
50. 109 N.L.R.B. at 600, 34 L.R.R.M. at 1390 (1954) (members Murdock and Peter-
son dissenting).
51. 190 N.L.R.B. 718, 77 L.R.R.M. 1305 (1971).
52. Id. at 719-21, 77 L.R.R.M. at 1309. It should be noted that the Rodda Act
provides public school employers with far less latitude in responding to an employee
organization's request for recognition.
The public school employer shall grant a request for recognition ... unless:
(a) The public school employer desires that [a] representation election be con-
ducted or doubts the appropriateness of a unit. If the public school employer de-
sires a representation election, the question of representation shall be deemed to
exist and the public school employer shall notify the board, which shall conduct a
representation election ....
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3544.1(a) (West Supp. 1977) (emphasis added). Accordingly,
a public school employer may not simply refuse to recognize an employee organization
without taking further action. If affording the organization exclusive representative
status is deemed undesirable, a petition for an election must be filed. Nor may a
public school employer fail to file for an election, even when the employee organization
requesting recognition appears to lack majority support, without running the risk of
being found guilty of another unfair employment practice. See text accompanying
notes 58-74 infra.
53. For an example of how the California Supreme Court has treated this issue
in the context of public sector employment relations, see Social Workers' Union, Local
535 v. Alameda County Welfare Dept., 11 Cal. 3d 382, 521 P.2d 453, 113 Cal. Rptr.
461 (1974).
54. Compare CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3543, 3543.5(a) (West Supp. 1977) with 29
U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1) (1970).
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means of determining the validity of an employee organization's claim
to majority support.55 The recognition procedure set out in the Act
provides that to become the exclusive representative of the employees
in an appropriate unit, an employee organization must file a request
for recognition with the public school employer alleging that a majority
of the employees in that unit desire it to act as their exclusive repre-
sentative. The request must "include proof of majority support on the
basis of current dues deduction authorizations or other evidence such
as notarized membership lists, or membership cards, or petitions des-
ignating the organization as the exclusive representative of the em-
ployees. 56 Despite this procedure, a public school employer need not
grant the employee organization recognition if he "desires" and asks
for the holding of a representation election.5
In light of these provisions, public school employers have no identifi-
able interest in being allowed to test the validity of employee organiza-
tion claims of majority support by interrogating their employees-con-
duct which entails an obvious threat to the free exercise of organiza-
tional rights. The only appropriate approach, therefore, is to reject the
Struksnes rule and to hold such interrogation per se unlawful.
V. EMPLOYER DOMINATION AND SUPPORT
Employer domination and/or support of unions is expressly pro-
scribed by the NLRA. Section 8(a) (2) provides: "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for an employer. . . to dominate or interfere with
the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute
financial or other support to it."58
In the early days of the NLRA, the greatest number of violations
of this provision involved employer domination and control of so called
"company unions."59  In recent years, however, such cases have be-
come exceedingly rare.6" In fact, the courts are biased in favor of find-
55. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3544 (West Supp. 1977).
56. Id.
57. Id. § 3544.1(a).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(2) (1970).
59. See, e.g., NLRB v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 272 (1938); NLRB
v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 261 (1938). The usual remedy is
to order the complete disestablishment of the dominated union and any successor union
tainted by the illegality. See Carpenter Steel Co., 76 N.L.R.B. 670, 21 L.R.R.M. 1232
(1948).
60. See, e.g., NLRB v. O.E. Szekely & Assocs., Inc., 259 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1958);
Jack Smith Beverages, Inc., 94 N.L.R.B. 1401, 28 L.R.R.M. 1199 (1951), enforced,
202 F.2d 100 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 995 (1953).
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ing an employer guilty of the "lesser" offense of giving "assistance and
support," where his conduct violates the section.
61
The supplying of financial aid is not the only form of "assistance and
support" prohibited. Where employee representation is in question,
an employer is under a strict duty to maintain neutrality with respect
to the competing unions.62 He may not engage in any conduct which
would influence his employees in their selection of an exclusive repre-
sentative. 63  An employer clearly violates this duty if he overtly at-
tempts to persuade his employees to select a particular union as their
representative 4 or uses his own personnel to assist a union in its or-
ganizational efforts.65 A more difficult question, however, is whether
an employer violates section 8(a)(2) by granting a union recognition
in the mistaken belief that it has the support of a majority of his em-
ployees.
When the Supreme Court confronted this issue in International
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB (Bernhard-Altmann) ,66 it
held that by so extending recognition to a union, an employer commits
the unfair labor practices of interfering with the organizational rights
of his employees and giving unlawful assistance and support to a labor
organization. Significantly, the Court also held that good faith is no
defense to this alleged violation, reasoning that if it were, the right of
employees to freedom of choice and majority rule could be frustrated
by employer and union carelessness. 6s
The Rodda Act, like the NLRA, generally prohibits a public school
employer from interfering with his employees' exercise of their organ-
izational rights, 69 and expressly makes the domination and/or support
of an employee organization by a public school employer an unfair
61. See, e.g., NLRB v. Wemyss, 212 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1954).
62. Oil Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 440 F.2d 664, 665 (5th Cir. 1971).
63. Id.
64. NLRB v. Fotochrome, Inc., 343 F.2d 631, 633 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
833 (1965).
65. Hughes & Hatcher, Inc. v. NLRB, 393 F.2d 557, 565-67 (6th Cir. 1968). An
employer does not violate § 8(a)(2), however, by permitting employees to hold an
organizational meeting in a company building on their own time, so long as compet-
ing labor organizations are granted an equal opportunity to make use of the facilities.
Boyle's Famous Corned Beef Co. v. NLRB, 400 F.2d 154, 165-66 (8th Cir. 1968).
66. 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
67. Id. at 738.
68. Id. at 738-39. See also NLRB v. Hunter Outdoor Prods., Inc., 440 F.2d 876,
879 (1st Cir. 1971).
69. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3543.5(a) (West Supp. 1977).
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employment practice. 70 Inasmuch as the statutory approaches are vir-
tually identical, it is to be anticipated that relevant NLRA case law will
be followed by the courts in interpreting the Rodda Act. However,
public school employers may well argue that the Bernhard-Altmann
rule should not be applied in the new public education employment
relations procedure.
One of the primary justifications for holding an employer guilty
under the NLRA of an unfair labor practice if he, in good faith, recog-
nizes a union which lacks majority support is that he can protect himself
by simply taking no action whatsoever in response to a union request
for recognition.7' This alternative is not available, however, to a pub-
lic school employer under the Rodda Act, which provides:
The public school employer shall grant a request for recognition...
unless . . [t]he public school employer desires that [a] representation
election be conducted or doubts the appropriateness of a unit. If the
public school employer desires a representation election, the question
of representation shall be deemed to exist and the public school em-
ployer shall notify the board, which shall conduct a representation elec-
tion. .... 72
Thus, in the face of a request for recognition by an employee organiza-
tion, a public school employer has but two courses of conduct open to
him:73 he may recognize the organization as exclusive representative
or request a representation election. Given these options, the Bern-
hard-Altmann rule subjects a public school employer to an additional
affirmative duty. Not only is he required to refrain from recognizing
an employee organization which he mistakenly (but in good faith) be-
lieves to possess majority support, but he must also request a represen-
tation election.
Nonetheless there are two reasons for applying the Bernhard-Alt-
mann rule to the new public education employment relations proce-
dure. First, the requirement that an employer request a representation
election is not onerous. In fact, a public school employer can avoid
committing this unfair employment practice simply by filing for an elec-
tion whenever he receives a request for recognition. Second, as the
Bernhard-Altmann Court indicated, a contrary rule invites the risk of
70. Id. § 3543.5(d).
71. Linden Lumber Div., Summer & Co., 190 N.L.R.B. 718, 77 L.R.R.M. 1305
(1971).
72. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3544.1(a) (West Supp. 1977) (emphasis added).
73. This assumes the absence of other conditions. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3544.1
(b)-.(d) (West Supp. 1977).
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violating employee rights by frustrating their expectation of freedom
of choice and majority rule.74
In summary, application of NLRA principles to the Rodda Act would
establish the following rules in this area: (1) a public school employer
may not dominate an employee organization or otherwise involve himself
in the employee organization's internal affairs; (2) a public school em-
ployer may not contribute financial support to an employee organiza-
tion; (3) a public school employer is under a strict duty to maintain
neutrality when a representation question arises; (4) if a public school
employer fails to request an election, and grants recognition to an em-
ployee organization lacking majority support, he may be found guilty
of an unfair employment practice.
VI. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST EMPLOYEES
By far the most frequent unfair labor practice charge brought under
the NLRA is that of employer discrimination against employees. 75
The major basis of the law in this area is NLRA section 8(a)(3) which
provides: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer. . . by
discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in
any labor organization. '76 But NLRA sections 7 and 8(a) (1) can also
contribute to the outcome of discrimination cases. 77  Section 7 grants
employees the right to organize and "to engage in other concerted activ-
ities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection. . ... 7 Section 8 (a) (1) protects these rights by generally
prohibiting employer conduct, including forms of discrimination, which
interferes with their exercise. 79
These three sections together require proof of the following ele-
ments for an employer to be held guilty of discrimination: (1) that
the employer discriminated against his employees in regard "to hire or
tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment;" 80 (2)
74. 366 U.S. at 738-39.
75. In fiscal 1974, of the total 17,978 unfair labor practice charges brought against
employers, 11,620 or 65% alleged discrimination or illegal discharge of employees.
39 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 10 (1974).
76. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970).
77. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
78. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) (emphasis added).
79. Id. § 158(a).
80. The requirement that the discrimination be in regard "to hire or tenure of employ-
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that his employees were engaged in a protected "concerted activity;' '
and (3) that the employer's purpose was to discourage his employees'
exercise of their section 7 rights.8 2  While the first element is self-ex-
planatory, some clarification of the second and third is appropriate.
The NLRA protects employees only in their exercise of the rights
granted them in section 7.3 As such, NLRA sections 8(a)(1) and
(3) prohibit only those forms of employer discrimination which are
prompted by employee involvement in protected "concerted activi-
ties."184  Perhaps the best example of such an activity is a union con-
ducted strike for higher wages after an impasse has been reached in
negotiations.8 5 Employee conduct need not involve a union or be
otherwise organizational in nature, however, to be protected. It is suf-
ficient that it be "concerted" and for the "mutual aid or protection"
of the employees. s6 Employers are thus often barred from taking re-
prisals against employees who engaged in ad hoc conduct designed to
improve their employment conditions.
8 7
Not all "concerted activities" for the "mutual aid or protection" of
the employees are safeguarded. No protection against discrimination
will be afforded if "the particular activity involved is so indefensible
as to warrant the employer in discharging [or taking other disciplinary
ment or any term or condition of employment" is found only in § 8(a) (3). Though
it may appear inapplicable in cases where § 8(a)(1) controls, as a practical matter it
seems unlikely that any other forms of discrimination would be deemed to violate § 8
(a) (1).
81. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
82. Section 8(a)(3) requires that the employer's purpose be "to encourage or dis-
courage membership in any labor organization." Section 8(a)(1), however, protects
employees from employer conduct undertaken for the purpose of discouraging employees
from exercising any of their § 7 rights, including the right to engage in nonunion "con-
certed activities."
83. 23 N.L.R.B. ANN. REP. 64 (1959).
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
86. See NLRB v. Office Towel Supply Co., 201 F.2d 838, 840 (2d Cir. 1953);
Joanna Cotton Mills Co. v. NLRB, 176 F.2d 749, 752 (4th Cir. 1949); Root-Carlin,
Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. 1313, 1314, 27 L.R.R.M. 1235, 1236 (1951).
-87. See NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 17 (1962) (walkout
to protest lack of heating in machine shop where employees worked, after previous
complaint, was protected "concerted activity"); B & P Motor Express, Inc. v. NLRB,
413 F.2d 1021, 1023 (7th Cir. 1969) (conduct of four employees in leaving employ-
ment together upon learning of postponement of meeting with supervisor for purpose
of discussing overtime problem was protected "concerted activity"); Southern Oxygen
Co. v. NLRB, 213 F.2d 738, 741-42 (4th Cir. 1954) (employees' meeting and discuss-
ing among,themselves employer's new expense allowance policy, followed by collective
complaint to general manager, was protected "concerted activity").
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action against] the participating employees." '88 Thus, such conduct as
work slowdowns,8 "disloyal" statements regarding the quality of the
employer's product,90 and strikes during a period when they are pro-
hibited9' may be subject to employer reprisal.
Assuming it can be proven that an employer discriminated in regard
to "hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employ-
ment," and that he did so as a result of his employees' involvement
in protected "concerted activities," it must still be established that his
purpose was to discourage his employees' exercise of their section 7
rights. Traditionally, the burden was on the charging party (the Gen-
eral Counsel) to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence, in
light of all the surrounding circumstances that the employer was so mo-
tivated. 2 This allocation of the burden of proof has been substantially
altered in recent years.
In NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp.3 the Supreme Court created a
two pronged test for establishing improper employer motivation. If the
employer's action was either legitimate or ambiguous on its face, "spe-
cific evidence of a subjective intent to discriminate or to encourage or
discourage union membership" must be shown.94 If, on the other hand,
the employer's conduct was "inherently discriminatory," it must be
held that the employer intended "the very consequences which forsee-
ably and inescapably flow[ed] from his actions."'95
The Supreme Court subsequently undercut its "inherently discrim-
inatory" test of improper employer motivation in NLRB v. Brown.96
There, the Court held that where the tendency of an act to encourage
or discourage union membership is "comparatively slight" when bal-
88. Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333, 337, 26 L.R.R.M. 1493, 1494 (1950). The
Supreme Court held similarly in NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. 464 (1953),
that protection of employees' "concerted activity" turns on whether their discharge
could be found to be "for cause" within the meaning of NLRA § 10(c). Id. at 471-
74.
89. Elk Lumber Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 333, 26 L.R.R.M. 1493 (1950).
90. NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. 464 (1953).
91. See NLRB v. Indiana Desk Co., 149 F.2d 987 (7th Cir. 1945); Kellogg Co.,
189 N.L.R.B. 948, 77 L.R.R.M. 1071 (1971), enforced, 457 F.2d 519 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 490 U.S. 850 (1972). It should be noted, however, that strikes undertaken
during such periods to protest an employer's unfair labor practice are protected "con-
certed activities." Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 279-84 (1956).
92. NLRB v. West Point Mfg. Co., 245 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1957).
93. 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
94. Id. at 227.
95. Id. at 228.
96. 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
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anced against a legitimate business interest it is reasonably adapted
to advance, the burden is on the charging party to prove improper mo-
tivation by independent evidence. 7
The Supreme Court's current approach to the issue was adopted in
NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc. 8 Drawing upon both Erie Resistor
and Brown, the Court divided employer conduct into two categories:
that which is "inherently destructive" of employee rights, and that which
has a "comparatively slight" effect on those rights. 9 Irrespective of
the category into which the employer's action falls, "once it has been
proved that the employer engaged in discriminatory conduct which
could have adversely affected employee rights to some extent, the
burden is upon the employer to establish that he was motivated by legit-
imate objectives."'100 That is, oncd it has been proven that the em-
ployer discriminated against his employees in regard to "hire or tenure
of employment or any term or condition of employment" and that his
employees were engaged in a protected "concerted activity," the
burden is upon the employer to prove that his purpose was not to dis-
courage his employees' exercise of their section 7 rights.
The category in which the employer's conduct is placed determines
the degree of difficulty he will encounter in satisfying his burden of
proof. If his action is deemed to have been "inherently destructive"
of employee rights, the task will be virtually impossible. 01 If, on the
other hand, his activity is held to have had a "comparatively slight" ef-
fect on those rights, the employer can meet his burden by coming for-
ward "with evidence of legitimate and substantial business justifications
for the conduct."10
The method of analyzing discrimination cases under the Rodda Act
is likely to be similar to that employed under the NLRA. The con-
trolling Rodda Act provisions are California Government Code sections
3543 and 3543.5(a).' 01 Section 3543 grants public school employees
the right to: (1) "form, join and participate in the activities of em-
ployee organizations of their own choosing;" (2) refuse to join or par-
ticipate in such activities; and (3) "represent themselves individually
97. Id. at 287-88. See also American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
98. 388 U.S. 26 (1967).
99. Id. at 34.
100. Id. (emphasis in original).
101. See, e.g., Rushton & Mercier Woodworking Co., 203 N.L.R.B. 123, 83 L.R.R.M.
1070 (1973), enforced, 502 F.2d 1160 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 996 (1974).
102. 388 U.S. at 34.
103. CAL. GOv'T CODE §§ 3543, 3543.5(a) (West Supp. 1977).
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in their employment relations with the public school employer.' 10 4
Section 3543.5(a) combines the concepts of NLRA sections 8(a)(1)
and 8(a)(3) by providing that "[i]t shall be unlawful for a public school
school employer to . . .discriminate or threaten to discriminate against
employees, or otherwise to interfere with . . . employees because of
their exercise of rights guaranteed by this chapter."'105
Several features of this statutory framework should be noted. First,
the Rodda Act does not expressly require that the discrimination be
"in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition
of employment,"'" 6 as does the NLRA. It seems unlikely, however,
that the courts would hold other types of discrimination to violate the
prohibition, because it is difficult to envision how such discrimination
might adversely affect employee rights. Second, it does not grant pub-
lic school employees the right to engage in "other concerted activities
for . . .mutual aid or protection."'1 7  Therefore, public school em-
ployees are vulnerable to discrimination for engaging in a wide range
of non-union activities which the NLRA would protect. 0 8 Finally, the
Rodda Act requires that an employer who discriminates against em-
ployees "because of their exercise of rights guaranteed by this chapter"
be found guilty of an unfair employment practice.' 0 9
Accordingly, holding a public school employer guilty of discrimina-
tion under the Rodda Act will probably require proof of the following
elements: (1) that he discriminated against his employees in regard
to their hire, tenure or conditions of employment; (2) that his em-
ployees were engaged in the exercise of their rights under the Act; and
(3) that his purpose was to discourage his employees' exercise of those
rights. Upon proof of the first two elements, the burden should shift
to the public school employer to show the absence of the third element.
The weight of this burden should depend, however, upon whether the
conduct is deemed to fall into the "inherently destructive" or the "com-
paratively slight" category.
104. Id. § 3543. It should be noted that this section also grants employees the
right to present grievances to their employer "without the intervention of the exclusive
representative." Id.
105. Id. § 3543.5(a).
106. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970) with CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3543.5(a)
(West Supp. 1977).
107. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) with CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3543 (West Supp.
1977).
108. See notes 85-88 supra and accompanying text.
109. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3543.5(a) (West Supp. 1977).
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Regardless of the analytic approach ultimately adopted, the nature
of the discrimination which will occur in public education employment
relations in California is likely to be far less threatening to employee
rights than that occurring in the private sector under the NLRA. Em-
ployer discrimination cases brought pursuant to NLRA section 8(a)(1)
and 8(a)(3) have involved the permissibility of such actions as: (1)
discharging employees for engaging in unprotected "concerted activi-
ties;" 110 (2) hiring permanent replacements for striking employees;"'
(3) locking out employees in anticipation of a strike;" 2 (4) imple-
menting a system of granting replacements super-seniority credits;" 8
and (5) shutting-down operations in retaliation for employees' exercise
of their organizational rights."14  The probability of such issues arising
under the Rodda Act seems slight for several reasons. First, classified
and certified public school employees are generally insulated from dis-
charge by civil service and tenure protections." 5  Second, strikes by
public school employees are illegal."16 Finally, lockouts and shut-
downs by public school employers are financially and politically imprac-
tical. 7  Accordingly, where discrimination does occur it is likely to
take such forms as the reassignment of personnel to less desirable
schools, the assignment of unfavorable work responsibilities, the pro-
viding of poorer equipment, and the withholding of employment bene-
fits.
110. See NLRB v. Local 1229, IBEW, 346 U.S. 464 (1953); Elk Lumber Co., 91
N.L.R.B. 333, 26 L.R.R.M. 1493 (1950).
111. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
112. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
113. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
114. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263 (1965).
115. Civil service protections vary with the governmental agency involved. Tenure
of public school teachers is protected by state law. See CAL. EDUc. CODE § 13304
(West 1975).
116. 59 Op. CAL, A-r'y GEN. 197, 200 (1976) provides: "Strikes by public em-
ployees are against the law unless authorized by statute. Neither the Winton Act
([CAL. EDuc. CoDE] §§ 13080-13090 [repealed 1975]) nor Statutes 1975, Chapter 961
(Gov. Code §§ 3540-3549.3), which replaces the Winton Act, authorize teacher's
strikes." See also Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. United Teachers-Los Angeles,
24 Cal. App. 3d 142, 100 Cal. Rptr. 806 (1972); Trustees of the Cal. State Colleges
v. Local 1352, San Francisco State College Fed'n of Teachers, 13 Cal. App. 3d 863,
92 Cal. Rptr. 134 (1970); City of San Diego v. American Fed'n of State, County
& Mun. Employees Local 127, 8 Cal. App. 3d 308, 87 Cal. Rptr. 258 (1970); Almond
V. County of Sacramento, 276 Cal. App. 2d 32, 80 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1969).
117. Not only would a school board which chose to close down operations be likely
to incur negative political consequences because of the interest of parents in having
their children provided with an education, but the school district would lose state reve-
nue as a result of lower "average daily attendance." See CAL. Euc. CODs 1 17301
(West Supp. 1977).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Much of the language and many of the concepts used in the Rodda
Act's list of public school employer unfair employment practices were
drawn from analogous provisions in the NLRA. Whether or not the
rights and obligations created by the two statutes will be the same will
depend upon the issue under consideration. In this comment it has
been forecast that the law under the Rodda Act will differ in significant
respects from that under the NLRA with regard to the issues of non-
employee organizational solicitation, employer freedom of speech, and
employee interrogation. On the other hand, it has been predicted that
the law under the two statutes will be parallel with respect to the issues
of employer domination and control of employee organizations and dis-
crimination against employees. It remains to be seen whether the de-
cisions of the courts and the Educational Employment Relations Board
will bear this analysis out. The method, however, of examining the
private sector experience under the NLRA for the insights it can pro-
vide will clearly play a large role in the future development of law
governing public education employment relations in California.
Fred Ashley
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